#### Adversarial Training and Security in ML

#### Lili Mou, Priyank Jaini doublepower.mou@gmail.com

David R. Cheriton School of Computer Science University of Waterloo

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# Agenda

- Background of neural networks
  - Miniproject: CNN and its visualization
- Adversarial samples
  - Miniproject: Crafting adversarial data
- Open research



# Philosophy of Deep Learning

• Consider hand-written digit recognition



- Deep learning: End-to-end training
  - Input: raw signal (28 x 28 pixels)
  - Output: the target labels "7," "2," "1," "0," and "4."





(A) A single layer of neurons



(B) A deep neural network



## A Convolutional Neural Network







# Training

- How do we learn weights?
  - Backpropagation
  - Compute the partial derivative of a "loss" w.r.t. each parameter
  - Take a small step towards the derivative

y-axis: loss derivative x-axis: some parameter



## What are these features?

#### • Visualizing weights



Krizhevsky, Alex, Ilya Sutskever, and Geoffrey E. Hinton. "Imagenet classification with deep convolutional neural networks." *NIPS*. 2012.



## What are these features?

Visualizing the activation functions







# Mini-Project

Code

https://www.dropbox.com/s/iafhbi87mtk67gk/Adversa rial.zip?dl=0

Cached data

https://www.dropbox.com/s/m2qn92q5b8ky4mo/adv \_data.zip?dl=0

Slides available at

http://sei.pku.edu.cn/~moull12



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## Think of the Training Process

- Loss: L = f(x; w)
- Training objective: minimize L
- Compute:  $\nabla_w f(x; w)$



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• What if we compute:  $\nabla_x f(x; w)$ 



## **Adversarial Samples from Random**



Figure 5: Randomly generated fooling images for a convolutional network trained on CIFAR-10. These examples were generated by drawing a sample from an isotropic Gaussian, then taking a gradient sign step in the direction that increases the probability of the "airplane" class. Yellow boxes indicate samples that successfully fool the model into believing an airplane is present with at least 50% confidence. "Airplane" is the hardest class to construct fooling images for on CIFAR-10, so this figure represents the worst case in terms of success rate.

Goodfellow, Ian J., Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. "Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples." *ICLR*, 2015.



### Adversarial Samples from Real Data





$$\operatorname{sign}(\nabla_{\boldsymbol{x}}J(\boldsymbol{\theta},\boldsymbol{x},y))$$

"nematode" 8.2% confidence



 $m{x} + \epsilon \operatorname{sign}(
abla_{m{x}} J(m{ heta}, m{x}, y))$ "gibbon" 99.3 % confidence



"panda" 57.7% confidence

 $\boldsymbol{x}$ 

## Approach

$$X_{\text{adv}} = X - \epsilon \cdot \operatorname{sign}(\nabla_X J(X, y_{\text{target}}))$$

- y<sub>target</sub> : whatever target you want
- Take the sign of the partial derivative
  - Alternatively, we can truncate the gradiate
  - So that the adversarial image is not too far away
- Can interate several times if necessary



# Ubiquity of Adverarial Samples

- A same adversarial sample works:
  - For different networks (models)
  - Even after further perturbation with noise



Kurakin, Alexey, Ian Goodfellow, and Samy Bengio. "Adversarial examples in the physical world." *ICLR*, 2017



## Mini-Project

- Generate Adversarial Samples by Yourselves
- Results











6 (0.93) 4 (0.98) 3 (0.99) 5 (0.98) 9 (1.00)

• Interpretation, predicted as "4" w.p. 98%





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## **Open Topics**

- Test the robustness of NNs
- Further confirm the ubiquity of adv samples
- Crafting more deceptive adversarial samples
- Training more robust machine learning models



#### Thanks!

QA